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 THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY 
SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY: 
A CASE STUDY OF SPAIN 
ENARPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 15/JUNE 2006 
CONSUELO VARELA-ORTEGA, ARANCHA SIMÓ AND IRENE BLANCO 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the comparative analysis and evaluation of the impact of 
multifunctionality on the agricultural sector for different scenarios that take into account 
the protection of the environment and natural resources as well as the international trade 
agreements in the context of the EU agricultural sector. The research focuses on two different 
regions in Spain that represent the continental agriculture of the region of Castilla-Leon in the 
northern central plateau and the Mediterranean fertile agriculture of Andalusia in the south. The 
analysis has been carried out based on mathematical programming models that simulate 
farmers’ behaviour and their response to the different policy scenarios that correspond to the EU 
agricultural policies (CAP programmes) and water policies (Water Framework Directive) 
currently in place. Specifically, these scenarios are: full and partial decoupling, subsidy 
modulation, crop prices reduction, cross-compliance measures and water pricing policies. 
Results indicate that the new decoupled CAP will not lead to drastic changes in land use in the 
two regions studied but will have negative repercussions on farmers’ income. Moreover, the 
introduction of additional measures, such as cross-compliance, will contribute substantially to 
improving and protecting the environment even though they amount to an additional cost for 
farmers. Reduction in crop prices will have significant effects on international trade and is likely 
to produce a reduction in farm intensification and hence a beneficial effect on the environment 
but will involve negative socio-economic impacts in marginal rain-fed farms. As regards the 
integration of agricultural and water conservation policies, the application of the EU Water 
Framework Directive in conjunction with the new CAP reform would produce different region-
specific effects and might question the viability of a number of irrigated farms in Spain. 
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THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY 
SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY: 
A CASE STUDY OF SPAIN 
ENARPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 15/JUNE 2006 
CONSUELO VARELA-ORTEGA, ARANCHA SIMÓ AND IRENE BLANCO 
1. Introduction 
1.1  Objective of the study and general overview 
The objective of Work Package 5.3 is to conduct a comparative analysis and evaluation of the 
impact of multifunctionality (WP4.3) for each of the different multifunctionality scenarios 
defined in WP.3.3. This report includes the specific case study of Spain in which the analysis 
focuses on the predicted regionally-based farmers’ reactions to various distinct policy scenarios 
that are relevant to the current policy framework and multifunctionality in the agricultural 
sector. 
This region-specific analysis has been conducted based on the fact that the application and 
definition of the term multifunctionality differs from one country to another and even from one 
region to another, taking into account the particularity of each situation. Therefore, any study 
analysing multifunctionality has to be tailored to the problems and demands of a particular area 
or region. In this respect the regions chosen for the Spanish case study are representative of 
Spain’s varied agriculture and correspond to different agro-climatic conditions, types of 
agricultural systems, modes of farm production, labour use and institutional organisation. 
The report is organised in six sections: 
The first section includes an introduction with a general overview of the policy context as well 
as a summary of the concepts of multifunctionality in the agricultural sector with specific 
reference to the Spanish case study.  
Section 2 is dedicated to the policy framework in which a first sub-section (heading 2.1) 
analyses the most relevant measures adopted in Spain regarding the main on-going policies, 
such as the CAP reform. The second part of this section (heading 2.2) describes the different 
policy scenarios selected in accordance with the current and future policy contexts as well as the 
instruments chosen to achieve particular policy objectives within a multifunctionality approach.   
Section 3 focuses on the methodology of the analysis. It describes the different study regions 
selected in Spain, namely Andalucia in the south and Castilla y León in the northern central 
plateau (heading 3.1), followed by the farm typology and the structure of the representative 
farms on which the analysis will be based (heading 3.2). The last part of this section (heading 
3.3) describes the modelling approach which is further specified in the respective annex.  
Section 4 presents the results of the model simulations in the two study regions for the different 
policy scenarios defined in section 2. It focuses on the analysis of the impacts for each proposed 
scenario and their implications for land distribution, cropping pattern selection, farm income 
level, the environment and the use of natural resources.  
Section 5 includes the most significant conclusions of this research and Section 6 the 
bibliographical references. The final part of the report includes four annexes that show in detail 2 | VARELA-ORTEGA, SIMÓ & BLANCO 
   
the contents of the different sections: Annex 1 the farm typology, Annex 2 and Annex 3 the 
results tables for the two regions respectively and Annex 4 the detailed specification of the 
models developed for the simulation analysis. 
The policy overview 
Agriculture in most EU countries as well as in Spain is still the sector with the biggest impact 
on land use and utilization of natural resources, having a very significant influence on 
population settlement in the rural areas, landscape shape and overall environmental impacts and 
degradation of the natural resource base (Baldock et al., 2000; Varela & Supmsi, 2002; 
Brouwer, 2004b) 
The latest CAP reforms have set Spanish and European agriculture the challenge of building 
multifunctional, sustainable and competitive farming systems compatible with an increased 
protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources. However, the anticipated 
fall in farm prices could jeopardise not only agricultural production itself but also the generation 
of other closely-related public assets, such as natural ecosystems, biodiversity, landscape, soil, 
water and water-related ecosystems. In this respect, the application and integration of different 
EU regulations, such as, for example, the WFD in the water domain, are more necessary and 
indispensable than ever before for protecting these assets (Mejías et al., 2004) 
Most of the agricultural reforms in the past decades have come about as a result of international 
pressure and especially from multilateral trade negotiations, (Antle et al., 1998; Benjamin & 
Houee, 2003; Petit, 2003a and 2003b; Emlinger et al., 2004). One of the clearest examples is the 
1992 reform, when the EU reduced intervention prices in return for which it introduced 
compensatory payments (direct payments coupled to production). Later, and with a view to the 
subsequent rounds of trade negotiations, the next CAP reform, Agenda 2000, was passed and 
aimed to continue the “liberalisation of agriculture” begun in 1992 by gradually decoupling 
support as part of a process commonly known as ‘greening agriculture’ (moving blue box 
support to the green box). Based on the establishment of production-related direct aid payments, 
the Agenda 2000 CAP reform gave a prominent role to agri-environmental instruments to 
support a sustainable development of rural areas and to respond to society’s increasing demand 
for environmental services.  
At the same time, rural development measures sought to stabilise and support rural communities 
by further integrating environmental and socio-economic aspects as member states were given 
the option to make access to the CAP aid payments conditional on their meeting certain 
environmental requisites (cross-compliance option). For this purpose, intervention prices 
continued to fall, whereas direct payments (now no longer for compensatory purposes) 
continued to rise and environmental considerations were clearly reinforced, as the concepts of 
‘cross-compliance’ and ‘modulation’ were introduced and further reinforced in the strongly 
debated mid-term review of the CAP.   
Following this trend, with the aim of adapting to the changes in agriculture and the new 
international economic context, the EU developed the New Common Agricultural Policy in the 
so-called ‘Luxembourg reform’ in 2003, taking advantage of the CAP mid-term review. The 
new CAP proposes the consolidation of the concept of ‘cross-compliance’, by which all farmers 
will have to comply with established environmental regulations (and other type of existing 
regulations) to receive direct payments. At the same time, the new CAP establishes the 
compulsory ‘modulation’ of support and a modification of the type of direct payments through 
‘decoupling’, in which all direct payments become a single farm payment based on a reference 
amount independent from production.  In this way, the EU aims to transform the blue box 
subsidies (direct payments) into green box subsidies (single farm payments) to conform to 
environmental requirements and trade negotiations agreements. THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY | 3 
 
In sum, despite a country-specific, regionally-based and heterogeneous implementation 
perspective of the new CAP and cross-compliance measures (Varela & Calatrava, 2004; 
Brouwer et al., 2002; Baldock, 2004,Spash et al. 1997), this new set of policies constitute a 
major challenge for incorporating environmental requirements and nature conservation 
standards into agricultural production activities in the EU (Brouwer, 2004a). 
1.2 Multifunctionality  in  agriculture 
Multifunctionality is not solely specific to agriculture and characterises many economic 
activities that entail the production of multiple outputs providing a wide range of societal needs. 
Complementary to its primary activity of producing food and fibre, the agricultural sector can 
also provide non-commodity outputs, such as environmental goods and services by shaping 
landscape and natural sites, preserving biodiversity, conserving land and renewable water 
resources and contributing to the socio-economic development of rural settings (OECD, 2001a; 
Brouwer, 2004b). However, this joint production of commodity outputs (COs) and non-
commodity outputs (NCOs) that characterises agricultural activity involves the presence of 
positive and negative externalities due to the public good character of the latter and the absence 
of market-based mechanisms for the provision of such NCOs.  
The concept of multifunctionality is still not systematically defined or fully agreed across 
different regions, countries and international organisations and therefore it is subject to different 
interpretations, including its usefulness for agricultural policy analysis, debate and reform 
(Multagri, 2005; Varela, 2005; Reig, 2005; Brouwer, 2004b). Ample research has been 
conducted based largely on the positive view of multifunctionality in agriculture regarded as an 
economic activity of multiple interlinked outputs that are jointly produced, deriving positive and 
negative externalities (OECD, 2001a). This supply-oriented multifunctionality conceptual 
research has permitted the elaboration of a conceptual framework and a basis for discussion of 
policy intervention and debate (OECD, 2001a and 2001b).  
EU recent research on multifunctionality in agriculture (Multagri, 2005, Brouwer, 2004b) has 
somehow enlarged the positive vision by integrating the supply side (production of COs and 
NCOs) and demand side (societal and consumer preferences) of multifunctionality and 
incorporating a more normative approach where MF plays a role for achieving a balanced 
integration of agronomic, economic, environmental, social and institutional aspects (Potter, C, 
2004) . Therefore, in this view, MF is goal-oriented as it fulfils varied societal functions in 
different private and public institutional settings and plays a crucial role as analytical framework 
for the analysis of integrated resource management of complex systems and a valuable tool for 
policy decision-making (Cairol et al., 2005). 
1.3 Multifunctionality  in  Spain 
The concept of multifunctionality has not had very much impact on the Spanish administration’s 
decision making and policy positioning. Not until recently, in the “White Paper on Agriculture 
and Rural Development” (MAPA, 2003b), was farming classed as a multifunctional activity 
(Reig, 2005) that helps to preserve natural resources taking into account that the goods produced 
by Spanish agriculture are classed as public assets. (MINAM,2000) 
Following the OECD conceptual framework analysis of Multifunctionality (OECD, 2001a), the 
joint-production processes encountered in the Spanish agricultural sector evidence the existence 
of an ample variety of farming systems (Tió & Atance, 2001). These range from extensive rain-
fed herbaceous crops, such as traditional cereal, oilseeds and fallow lands to intensive irrigated 
farming systems, such as horticulture and fruit trees in the Mediterranean littoral and inland 
irrigated crops such as maize, sugar beet, cotton and tobacco. From extensive inland livestock 4 | VARELA-ORTEGA, SIMÓ & BLANCO 
   
systems (cattle, sheep and goat) to intensive animal-production farms (pigs, poultry and calves) 
to the extensive traditional farming systems of integrated arable crops, forest and livestock 
productions (mixed productions of cereal, Holm oak, cork oak and Iberian pig, sheep or cattle, 
called ‘dehesas’) characteristic of the southwester agriculture in the Iberian peninsula (Díaz et 
al., 1997).  
The production of NCO, positive and negative externalities, jointly produced linked to these 
varied farming systems, have been reviewed and analyzed in a general integrated 
Multifunctionality perspective (Tió and Atance, 2001; Reig, 2001, Reig 2005) and also based on 
one-sided research works focused on specific issues
1 (Arnalte & Ortiz, 2004; Viladomiu & 
Rosell, 2002; Varela & Sumpsi, 1998; Fundación Marcelino Botín, 1999; Baldock et al., 2000; 
Coleto et al., 2003, among others). Negative externalities are commonly associated with 
intensive agricultural systems such as intensive livestock and irrigated agriculture and also with 
olive groves in erosion-prone areas (Calatrava, 2004). Ground water irrigation, a common 
source of water in the Mediterranean coastline fertile farming, is particularly prone to 
environmental impacts. Over-exploitation of aquifers and the subsequent degradation of the 
associated wetlands have been reported as one of the major negative externalities linked to 
agricultural production and irrigation development (Fundación Marcelino Botín, 1999; Varela et 
al., 2002; Coleto et al., 2003). Positive externalities are commonly associated to the Spanish 
extensive inland farming systems of mixed productions, such as the dehesas (Diaz et al., 1997) 
or to the cereal growing steppes for birds’ conservation (Donázar et al., 1997)  
The Spanish view on agricultural multifunctionality has been largely based on the idea that 
“agricultural multifunctionality policies are designed to maintain the traditional and extensive 
farming system to keep up marginal areas” (Viladomiu et al., 2002). However, it has also been 
argued that the EU rural development funds in Spain are not aimed at favouring and promoting 
agricultural multifunctionality. In fact, the process of agricultural development itself does not 
primarily encourage rural development (Arnalte & Ortiz, 2004). In sum, multifunctionality in 
Spain is still not well structured as a research agenda and needs a further impulse to play a 
major role in agricultural policy analysis and enter the forefront of Spain’s agricultural policy 
debate. 
2. Policy  framework 
2.1  The CAP reform implementation in Spain 
The main provisions of the CAP reform have been defined in line with the European regulation. 
Spain has opted to: 
-  Implement the single farm payment for all products covered by the reform, i.e. to start up as 
of 1 January 2006. 
-  Seeds will be excluded from the single payment. 
-  The annual percentage modulation will be applied to both the direct subsidies and to the part 
that remains coupled to production (5% in 2006 and 6% in 2007-13). 
-  The Canary Islands will be excluded from the application of the single farm payment and 
the annual percentage modulation will not be applied in either the Canary or the Balearic 
Islands. 
                                                 
1 For a literature review following the OECD multifunctionality framework, see Tió & Atance, 2001. For 
an integrated supply-demand goal-oriented multifunctionality approach, see the Spanish report on 
multifunctionality (Reig, 2005) of the EU project MULTAGRI (2005). THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY | 5 
 
-  COP (cereal, oilseed and protein) crops will be partially untied or decoupled (25% of 
subsidies will remain coupled to production). The primary goals of this choice are to 
prevent land abandonment, to stop the distortion of competition between different activities 
and farms and to make voluntary set aside in low-yield districts more flexible. 
-  As regards the beef sector, Spain has opted to maintain 100% of the slaughter premium, 
100% of the suckler cow premium and 40% of the beef special premium. 
-  In the sheep and goat sectors, 50% of the premium per head is retained, as this sector 
maintains fragile and valuable ecosystems in less-favoured and mountainous areas. 
2.2 Specification  of policy scenarios 
In this part, the proposed scenarios are described, as are the objectives of the different policies 
and the instruments selected to achieve these objectives. 
Description of each scenario 
Agenda 2000: This scenario will be the baseline situation or starting point. 
The new CAP scenarios: ‘full or partial decoupling’, which are represented, respectively, by a 
coupled value of 0% and 25% (for which Spain will opt). Additionally, within these two 
scenarios, a 4% modulation of subsidies has been included, representing the reform of the 
second pillar of the CAP, the funds for which will be available as of 2006 and will serve to fund 
rural development projects.  
Cross Compliance measures as part of the new CAP policy (CEE, Nº.796/2004 & CEE, Nº. 
1782/2003 ) to start in January 2006 (Varela & Calatrava, 2004).  
Product prices reduction (10%) with full decoupling as a consequence of a liberalisation of 
agricultural trade.  
Policy instruments and objectives 
The different goals can be achieved by different means. However, we have opted in our research 
for the following instruments:  
First we have introduced several instruments that will permit us to achieve the environmental 
requirements defined in the cross-compliance measures of the new CAP reform:  
•  The first is the obligation to keep a percentage of the COP-growing area as a buffer strip. 
This measure will contribute to reducing nitrogen pollution of soil and rivers from 
fertilizers. These buffer strips will absorb the surplus nitrogen, thereby preventing nitrogen 
from leaching to deeper strata. 
•  Nevertheless, the fact that this measure brings with it additional costs for farmers and that, 
consequently, a reduction in their income level is to be expected cannot be overlooked. 
•  The second measure is a prohibition of mono-cropping. This measure first encourages crop 
biodiversity and second reduces the application of plant protection products and pesticides, 
as the practice of rotation can reduce the risk of infections and pests.  
•  Introduction of a tax on the purchase of nitrate fertilizers to encourage a better fertilizer 
management in nitrate vulnerable zones. This will be a progressive tax levied in euros/kg. 
This measure is designed to reduce the amount of nitrogen fertilizers used or at least 
encourage more rational use and better management of such fertilizers. Consequently, this 6 | VARELA-ORTEGA, SIMÓ & BLANCO 
   
measure should lead to an improvement in soil conservation and a reduction in nitrate 
pollution. 
•  Joint application of new Common Agricultural Policy and the EU Water Framework 
Directive (CEE Nº 327/2000). The WFD represents a newly designed integrated 
Community action in the water domain. Accordingly, Art. 4 states: 
Member States shall protect, enhance and restore all bodies of surface water, with 
the aim of achieving good surface water status at the latest 15 years after the date 
of entry into force of this Directive. 
To achieve this aim, we have chosen the economic instrument of introducing a volumetric 
charge to the pricing of water to encourage efficiency in the use of water. Volumetric water 
pricing raises objections among farmers as farm income is penalized but it is one the most 
commonly used economic instrument for increasing water use efficiency (Ward & Michelsen, 
2002; Johansson et al., 2002; Agudelo, 2001, Sumpsi et al., 1998; Varela et al., 1998; 
Rosegrant et al., 2002; Chohin-Kuper et al., 2003). 
The application of a water pricing policy (in the different CAP contexts) can permit the 
recovery of water supply costs by the water charges collected, which is another of the key goals 
of the WFD (Art. 9):  
Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water 
services, including environmental and resource costs, having regard to the 
economic analysis and in accordance in particular with the polluter pays principle. 
Member States shall ensure by 2010: 
-  That water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water 
resources efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this 
Directive,… 
Accordingly, we have transformed the current fixed pricing system into a binomial pricing 
system (two-part tariff), in which a progressive volumetric tariff of  0.015€ for 15 price levels is 
added to the area-based system now in place (following Sumpsi et al., 1998; Varela et al., 1998; 
Varela et al., 2002). 
Briefly, all the scenarios, goals, instruments and potential effects can be grouped to form the 
following Table 1. Table 2 gives an example of the application of a policy scenario defined by 
partial decoupling (75%) (the current Spanish option), with a 4% modulation and cross-
compliance measures, the objectives to be attained, the related EU directive and the instrument 
selected to achieve the defined objectives. 
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Table 1. Scenarios, policy instruments, policy objectives and effects 
SCENARIO  POLICY 
OBJECTIVES 
POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS  EFFECTS 
AGENDA 2000  -Soil conservation 
-Reduction of nitrate 
pollution 
-Biodiversity 
-Buffer Strips 
-Crop diversity 
-Reduction of nitrate 
pollution 
-Tax on nitrate 
fertilizers 
Partial decoupling 
-Conservation of water 
resources 
-Water quota 
-Water prices 
-Soil conservation 
-Reduction of nitrate 
pollution 
-Biodiversity 
-Buffer strips 
-Crop diversity  Full decoupling 
-Reduction of nitrate 
pollution 
-Tax on nitrate 
fertilizers 
-Soil conservation 
-Reduction of nitrate 
pollution 
-Biodiversity 
-Buffer strips 
-Crop diversity  Support price reduction 
and full decoupling 
- Water resources 
conservation 
-Water quota 
-Water prices 
-LAND USE 
 
-CROPPING PATTERN 
 
-FARM INCOME(social effects, 
private sector) 
 
-ENVIRONMENT 
 
-COST-EFFECTIVENESS (public 
sector) 
 
 
Table 2. Scenarios, policy objectives, European directives and instruments 
SCENARIO  OBJECTIVE  EU DIRECTIVE  INSTRUMENT 
•  Reduction of Nitrate pollution 
•  Protection of biodiversity 
•  Soil conservation 
•  Nitrates Dir 
 
•  Habitats Dir 
•  Annex IV GAEC 
 
BUFFER 
STRIP 
•  Reduction of pesticide and 
insecticide contamination 
•  Protection of biodiversity 
•  Soil conservation 
•  Ground Water Dir 
•  Habitats Dir 
•  Birds Dir 
•  Annex IV GAEC 
SINGLE CROPPING 
PROHIBITION 
 
Partial decoupling 
 
+ 
 
Modulation 
 
+ 
 
Cross-compliance 
•  Reduction of Nitrate pollution  •  Nitrates Directive  TAX TO NITRATE 
FERTILIZERS 
 
Two regions of Spain have been chosen for this study representing different agro-climatic 
conditions, varied farming systems, cropping potential, land use and structural and institutional 
settings. The region of Andalucia in southern Spain is characterised by a fertile varied 
agriculture of an ample cropping diversity. The region of Castilla y León in the central northern 
plateau is representative of in-land continental agriculture of a more limited cropping and land 
use patterns. The policy scenarios are similar in both regions (except for full decoupling 
scenario that has only been analysed in Andalucia), but the policy objectives have been defined 
in a different manner in both regions, as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3. The relationship between the scenarios and the different selected regions 
  SCENARIOS  POLICY OBJECTIVES 
Andalucía 
-Agenda 2000 
-Full decoupling 
-Partial decoupling 
-Prices reduction 
-Soil conservation 
-Reduction of nitrate pollution 
-Biodiversity 
Castilla y León 
 -Agenda 2000 
-Partial decoupling 
 -Prices reduction 
- Water resources conservation 
 
3. Methodological  framework 
3.1 Characterisation  of study regions 
The two autonomous regions selected for this research are shown in the map below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Autonomous region of Castilla y León 
The selected drainage basin was the Duero basin, an area with surplus resources located in the 
Autonomous Region of Castilla y León, which suffers from water shortages only occasionally in 
periods of drought. 
The water user associations within the Hydrographical Confederation of the Duero were 
selected taking into account the following criteria (following Bolea, 1998; Sumpsi et al., 1998; 
Varela-Ortega. 2002; Varela et al., 2002): 
-  Years of service 
1. Autonomous 
region of 
Castilla y León
2. Autonomous 
region of 
Andalucía THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY | 9 
 
-  Geographic location 
-  Surface area 
-  Water availability and source 
-  Water distribution system 
-  Irrigation techniques 
-  Most commonly grown crops 
-  Farm structure 
-  Organisational systems and internal operation 
-  Pricing systems 
-  Investments and improvements 
-  Costs recovery 
-  Data availability 
Two water user associations (WUA) were finally selected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The key characteristics of each association are listed in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Description of selected WUAs 
WUA  Vegas de Saldaña y 
Carrión  Canal del Duero 
Province  Palencia  Valladolid 
Region  Saldaña  Centro 
Municipality  Saldaña  Tudela de Duero 
Year of establishment  1942  1972 
Infrastructure ownership  Public  Private 
Area (ha)  11966  5000 
Number of irrigators   3300  2000 
Water source  Carrión River  Duero River 
Water allotment (m
3/ha)  4600  5100 
Irrigation technology  Gravity  Sprinkler 
Pricing system   77 (€/ha)  118 (€/ha) 
Water distribution system  On demand  On demand/ By turn 
WUA revenue (€)  921382  590000 
On-going modernization 
programmes  Yes  No 
Investment cost (€)  9003698.00  26178.78 
Source: Own elaboration from INE (2002) surveys.  
Burgo
Palencia 
Valladolid 
León  9 Province: 
Palencia 
9 Region: 
Saldaña-   
Valdavia 
9 Municipality
: Saldaña 
1. Vegas de Saldaña y Carrión WUA 
Valladolid
Palencia
Segovia
Z 
a 
m 
o 
r 
a 
2. Canal de Duero WUA 
9 Province: 
Valladolid 
9 Region: 
Centro 
9 Municipality:  
    Tudela de Duero 10 | VARELA-ORTEGA, SIMÓ & BLANCO 
   
As we can see, there is not much difference between the number of irrigators and water 
allotment in the two water districts.  
The Canal del Duero is a more modern water user association (WUA) with innovative irrigation 
systems (like sprinklers) and whose private infrastructures are in fairly good condition and 
whose investment has already been amortised. 
The Vegas de Saldaña y Carrión WUA, on the other hand, covers an area that is twice as big as 
the other irrigation association. It is older and uses less advanced irrigation techniques and 
systems. Its infrastructures are inadequate, but are being improved thanks to a subsidy granted 
by the Castilla y Leon Regional Government and plot concentration that has been going on in 
the area. 
 
2. Autonomous region of Andalucía 
Two municipalities have been selected in the second region. These are two municipalities 
located in the province of Córdoba (Autonomous Region of Andalucía), called Palma del Río 
and Córdoba, as shown in the map below. 
 
 
 
 
    Córdoba capital      Palma del Río  
Source: Multi-territorial Information System of Andalucía. IEA. 
 
This is a region located in southern Spain covering part of the Guadalquivir River Valley 
(Varela et al., 1998). The characteristic of this region is that it is an area with an agriculture of 
high commercial and business capitalisation thanks to a remarkable production potential, a wide 
variety of crops, as well as being highly representative of different farm size strata in the 
Autonomous Region of Andalucía. Both municipalities making up the study area have been 
characterised geographically, edaphologically and climatologically (Simó, 2005; Carpy-
Goulard, 2001). Indeed, the whole area derives a considerable competitive advantage from its 
agroclimatic conditions in terms of the production of a wide variety of traditional crops (such as 
durum and soft wheat, sunflower, maize, cotton and chickpea), as well as the production of fruit 
and vegetables. The main selected productions make up over 60% of the whole UAA regulated 
by the CAP programmes that will be the object of our study. 
This area is classed as a nitrate-vulnerable zone designated in the first phase of implementation 
of the transposition of the Nitrates Directive (BOE, 1996  Real Decreto261/1996 of 16 
February) establishing the compulsoriness of determining what bodies of water are polluted or THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY | 11 
 
at risk of being polluted by nitrates draining from agricultural land (Boja 5 of 12 January 1999). 
Consequently, the adoption and simulation of measures for reducing nitrates pollution from 
agricultural land are thereby justified. 
3.2 Farm  typology 
Two model farms for each water user association and three farms in Andalucía have been built 
from the statistical data itemised by size strata (INE and INEA) (see Annex 1 for farm typology 
by districts). 
These farms are statistically representative of the area in terms of crop distribution, area, 
number of farms and percentage of irrigated land and are the ones simulated in the mathematical 
programming model. 
Crop distribution by farm size conveys the importance of particular strata. In Andalucía and 
Castilla-León, the selected model farms account for 83.8% and 50% of the growing area and 37% 
and over 35% of the total number of farms, respectively. (See Annex 1 for farm typology by 
districts and municipalities). 
The system of production defined using the model farms will reproduce the current crop 
distribution in the different study areas as can be seen from Tables 5 and 6 which show the 
characteristics of the farms. 
 
Table 5. Farm typology characteristics in Castilla y León 
WUAs  Vegas de Saldaña y 
Carrión  Canal del Duero 
Farm type  F1  F2  F3  F4 
UAA (%)  53  40 
Farms (%)  25  56 
Area  20 ha  80 ha  70 ha  250 ha 
Irrigated area (%)  100  60  60  30 
Fallow  7.5  10  11.12  7 
Wheat (intensive)  0  19.37  0  0 
Wheat (extensive)  0  20  32  42 
Barley (intensive)  20  4.36  10  5.01 
Barley (extensive)  0  10  0  19.6 
Sunflower (intensive)  10  2.24  0  0 
Sunflower (extensive)  0  0  0  1.4 
Maize  50  28.8  15.74  5.82 
Sugar beet  11  3.73  21.42  10.07 
Potato  1.5  1.5  9.72  9.1 
Total area (%)  100  100  100  100 
 Source: Own elaboration from INE 1999 and farmer surveys. 
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Table 6. Farm typology characteristics in Andalucía 
     F 1  F 2  F 3 
UAA (ha)     15  80  200 
Irrigation %     100  70  25 
S1  100  60  30  Soils (%) 
   S2  0  40  70 
Durum wheat  40  30  35 
Soft wheat    10  13 
Sunflower    20  25 
Cotton  15  15    
Maize  20  15  10 
Beans        
Chickpeas    5  7 
Special crop  20      
Land  
distribution 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Fallow  5  5  10 
s1: Good quality soil  100  100  100 
s2: Medium quality soil       
Source: Own elaboration from IEA (2004) farmer surveys. 
3.3  The modelling approach 
Within the variety of methods and instruments for investigating the impact of agricultural and 
environmental policies, we have chosen a mathematical programming modelling approach. As 
any model is an instrument that imitates a simplified reality (Hazell & Norton, 1986), MPM can 
be used to analyse the foreseeable effects and consequences of different policies depending on 
the instruments used as well as to reproduce the behaviour of representative farmers in a given 
regional context (Flichman & Jacquet, 2004). In this view, as both general and individual 
equilibrium modelling are amply used for analysing policy impacts, we have developed 
individual equilibrium farm models that describe the behaviour of farmers confronted with 
different policy scenarios and policy instruments.  
Additionally, the measures of multifunctionality must be tailored to a particular area or region, 
as each area will have different kinds of problems, and consequently we have defined particular 
instruments for each region-specific case study. 
Individual mathematical programming of farm household models was built to characterize 
farmer’s behaviour in the two selected regions. The models are non-linear single-year static 
models with a risk component that can be summarised as follows:  
This model basically consists of maximizing the utility function (U) subject to given technical, 
economic and policy constraints (g) . This utility function is composed by a profit function (Z) 
and a risk vector (R) that takes into account climate as well as market prices variations (see 
Appendix 2. Model specification). 
Maximise U =  ) (x f ,   ) (x f  = Z -  R 
Subject to the following constraints   1 ) ( S x g ∈  
       2 S x∈   
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−  in the case of Castilla y León, the vector of the decision-making variables or vector of 
the activities defined by a given crop-growing area and by an associated given 
production technique. 
−  in the case of Andalucía, the variable of the area defined as the combination of activities 
as part of four-year crop rotations (A), soil quality and type (S) and the technical 
itinerary followed (T) (see Appendix 2: Model specification). 
The problem-solving instrument used is GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) (Brooke 
et al. 1998).  
Finally, the model has been duly calibrated and validated. Calibration was carried out using the 
risk aversion coefficient (calibration parameter) and validation was effected in two ways: 
•  Comparing the data on crop distribution output in the simulation results with the data of the 
representative farms in each area and  
•  Checking that the marginal value of land and labour matched the real land lease and wage 
prices in the respective study areas. 
The methodology can be summarised in the diagram in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1. Methodological scheme 
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4.  Scenario Impact Analysis 
We have built several tables showing the estimated effects of the different scenarios in the study 
regions in more detail. The results will be presented by region. 
1.  Autonomous region of Castilla y León (Northern central plateau of Spain)  
In this region, the analysis focuses on the use of water in the irrigated farms in two selected 
Irrigation Communities (Water User Associations or WUAs, which is the term commonly used 
in the specialised literature).  
The results show the effects of the different agricultural policy scenarios, namely Agenda 2000, 
partial decoupling and full decoupling on water consumption, farm income and revenue 
collected by the Irrigation Community (WUA) from the water fees paid by the farmers. In each 
of the policy scenarios, a water policy instrument has been applied defined by volumetric water 
tariffs that will encourage a more efficient water use by the irrigators in the selected Irrigation 
Communities. As water tariffs have been simulated for progressively increasing rates up to 15 
simulation levels (see Annex 3), the table below summarises the results that correspond to the 
water tariff that maximises the revenue collected by the Irrigation Community. 
Table 7. Simulation results: Region of Castilla y Leon 
WUA: Vegas de Saldaña y Carrión (VSC) 
EFFECTS 
Water volume  Income  Cropping pattern  POLICY 
SCENARIO 
POLICY 
INSTRUMENT 
Total 
(m3/ha)  % 
Total      
collection 
(€/ha) 
Cost 
recovery 
O&M + Inv. 
(%)   Total 
(€/ha)  %  Rain-fed 
(%) 
Irrigated 
(%) 
- 4650  100  77  69.53  480.43 100  24  76  Agenda 
2000  Water pricing
a 4304.85  92.57 529.01  100  111.30 23.16  24  76 
- 4650  100  77  69.53  461.94 96.15  26  74  Partial 
Decoupling + 
Modulation  Water pricing  4319.12  92.88 530.51  100  93.24  19.4  26  74 
Full 
Decoupling + 
Modulation 
Crop prices 
reduction (10%)  4650   100   77  69.53  452.58 94.2   25.44  74.56  
WUA: Canal del Duero (CD) 
EFFECTS 
Water 
volume   Income Cropping  pattern  POLICY 
SCENARIO 
POLICY 
INSTRUMENT 
Total 
(m3/ha)  % 
Total      
collection 
(€/ha) 
Cost 
recovery 
O&M + Inv. 
(%)  
Total 
(€/ha)  %  Rain-fed 
(%) 
Irrigated 
(%) 
- 5100  100  118 69.83  442.81 100  58  42  Agenda 
2000  Water pricing
b 2653.25 52  476.18  100  199.54 45  58  42 
- 5100  100  118 69.83  433.35 97.8  58  42  Partial 
Decoupling + 
Modulation  Water pricing  2833.33  55.5 500.05  100  187.1  42.25  58  42 
a Price = 0.105 €/m3 (highest collection in VSC WUA). 
b Price = 0.135 €/m3 (highest collection in CD WUA). 
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Scenario 1 (S1): Partial decoupling 
The change of agricultural policy scenario implies: 
-  Moving from Agenda 2000 to the partial decoupling scenario does not vary substantially the 
demand for water. Subsidy decoupling does not provide incentives to save water. 
-  In the move from Agenda 2000 to the partial decoupling scenario, the water charges 
collected by the WUAs are unchanged. 
-  Farmers’ income falls by 3% on average. The results output perfectly match the outcome 
forecast by the CAPRI model for this region. CAPRI is the model used by the EU to analyse 
the regional impact of the European Union’s common agricultural policy. Specifically, it 
will lead to a 5% loss of income for farmers growing COP crops in our region. 
-  The change of agricultural policy scenario will lead to a slight extensification of the 
growing area in the Vegas de Saldaña y Carrión WUA (VSC). The new CAP penalises 
crops, such as maize, that benefited from a bigger comparative advantage under Agenda 
2000. The maize-growing area will fall by 3.3% in relative terms and 8.9% in absolute 
terms. This forecast matches the results yielded by the EU’s CAPRI model, which specifies 
an 8% reduction in absolute terms for maize in this region. On the other hand, the potato-
growing area will increase notably, potato now being more profitable than the traditional 
irrigated crops. In view of this increase in the potato-growing area, the EU has provided a 
prohibition in regulation 1782 of this CAP reform for farmers benefiting from the single 
payment to redirect production towards fruit and potatoes so as not to cause distortions in 
the markets owing to surplus supply. 
These effects are observed generally in both water user associations. However, the variations 
are less marked in the Canal del Duero WUA (CD) because the larger size of its farms means 
that economies of scale are at work, making them adapt much more flexibly to change. 
Water Resources Conservation 
The goal of water resources conservation (Art. 4 of the WFD) achieved by means of an 
irrigation water pricing policy implies: 
•  Agenda 2000 
-  A reduction in the amount of water used in the elastic demand curve segment at relatively 
high prices (0.08-0.19 €/m
3) only (following De Fraiture et al., 2002; Iglesias et al. 1998). 
Figure 2. Water demand in the selected WUAs 
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- A disproportionate fall in farmers’ income. Accordingly, in the case of the Vegas de Saldaña 
y Carrión WUA, farmers would have to sacrifice 30-50% of their income to reduce the 
amount of water by 10-20%.  
 
Figure 3. Farmers’ income in the selected WUAs 
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-  An increase in water charges collected by the WUA and Hydrographical Confederation in 
the inelastic segment up to the maximum water charge price located at the start of the elastic 
demand curve segment (0.015-0.12 €/m3). 
-  An  incentive for farmers to switch strategies to less water-intensive crops, changes in 
production techniques and abandonment of irrigation. As shown in the figure below, when 
water is priced at 8 cents of an €, intensively-irrigated crops (such as maize or sugar beet) 
tend to diminish as less water-demanding crops increase (such as wheat or barley). Water-
demanding crops disappear when water tariffs reach 14 cents and irrigation is abandoned 
and solely rain-fed crops are grown when water tariffs mount to 18 cents. 
Figure 4. Crop distribution by water price (Vegas de Saldaña y Carrión WUA)(VSC) 
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•  New CAP 
The application of the new CAP, in comparison to the water pricing policy applied under 
Agenda 2000, implies:  
-  Less water conservation in the elastic demand curve segment. 
-  Smaller reduction of farmers’ income.  
-  More water charges collected by the public administration and WUA. 
-  A  bigger penalty for the growing area of water-intensive crops that had a greater 
comparative advantage within the Agenda 2000 scenario, the biggest loser being maize.  
Scenario 2 (S2): Product prices reduction 
The liberalisation of agricultural trade by means of a 10% reduction in product prices and full 
decoupling of payments implies (see also the following Table 6 above and Annex III, Table 26): 
-  The demand for water does not vary substantially. The 10% reduction is not sensitive 
enough to promote a reduction and conservation of surface water resources (see Table 6 
above). 
-  The water charges collected by the Water User Associations are unchanged, because water 
prices are not modified. 
-  Farmers’ income falls by 2% with respect to income earned in the partial decoupling 
scenario, that is, a 10% cut in product prices and full decoupling of subsidies will only 
reduce farmers’ income by 2% (see Table 6 above). 
-  A widespread reduction of COP cereals and especially irrigated COP cereals (such as 
wheat and barley), with maize-growing disappearing completely as full decoupling will 
penalise maize enormously in this region. This crop will lose all its comparative advantage, 
and there will be a slight increase in the sunflower-growing area, encouraged by its low 
production costs. The potato-growing area will increase from 4.6% to 27.69%. As was the 
case with the switch from Agenda 2000 to the partial decoupling scenario, potato is the 
biggest beneficiary of support decoupling (see Figure 5 and Annex III). 
-  Due to the disproportionate increase in potato farming, we have simulated a limit on the 
potato-growing area. The EU CAP reform Cross Compliance Regulation has arrived at 
identical forecasts and considers the possibility of prohibiting producers benefiting from the 
single payment from redirecting their production towards fruit and potato production under 
Regulations 1782/03 and 796/04. 
-  In this case, maize would again be produced, accounting for approximately 15% of the area, 
set aside would increase slightly and the intensive sunflower-growing area would double, 
increasing from 21% to 44% (Figure 5, Table 6 and Table 26 in Annex III). 
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Figure 5. Farmers’ strategy for partial decoupling, full decoupling with crop prices reduction 
and full decoupling with crop prices reduction and limit on potato growing (Vegas de 
Saldaña y Carrión WUA) 
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2.  Autonomous region of Andalucía 
The results for each of the simulated scenarios for the region of Andalucía are presented below. 
Scenarios 1 and  2: Partial and full decoupling 
We have not made a special distinction between the two scenarios, as the results do not vary 
significantly. 
Both the full and partial decoupling scenarios are found to have effects on: 
9  Crop distribution and therefore land use, 
9  Farmers’ income level and  
9  Production techniques that will consequently have a specific impact on the environment. 
The first observable consequence is the reduction of durum wheat- and cotton-growing areas, 
as, with the introduction of the single payment, these crops will lose the comparative advantage 
that they had under Agenda 2000. 
Soft wheat is the only cereal that benefits from the reform (which matches the 2003 INRA study 
entitled Impacts du compromis de Luxembourg sur les grandes cultures and CAPRI results & 
Junta de Andalucía, 2003). The chief reason is that it is a crop that provides farmers with a high 
gross margin, that is, at equal support levels, soft wheat production costs are lower than for 
other crops (see Annex 2, Tables 9, 10 and 11). 
The effects of one of the main provisions of this scenario, namely the different production 
coupled percentages, do not have very significant impacts in terms of crop distribution. 
However, the effects in terms of farmers’ income level will be quite sizeable, and the reduction 
will be directly proportional to the percentage applied (see Annex 2, Table 12). THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY | 19 
 
Some differences have been observed between the partial and full decoupling scenarios as 
regards farmers’ income. It is noteworthy that neither full nor partial decoupling affects rain-fed 
and irrigated farms equally. For example, for a small irrigated farm with 5% support 
modulation, the income level will increase by +11.07% in the case of full decoupling and by 
+6.79% in the case of partial decoupling. However, for a large rain-fed farm, the farmer’s 
income will fall by -19.24% in the case of full decoupling and -19.71% in the case of partial 
decoupling. 
Figure 6. The net income variation: Total and partial decoupling 
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9  Policy instrument: cross-compliance measures (buffer strips and prohibition of single crop 
cultivation) 
Examining the results for both policy instruments grouped under cross-compliance (BOE 2002; 
BOE, 2004), the distribution and therefore output of the different crops remains almost 
unchanged with respect to the first scenario (see Annex 2, Tables 13, 14 and 15). 
However, farmers’ income level is found to change (see Annex 2, Tables 16 and 17). In this 
case, the fall in income is higher on irrigated farms than rain-fed farms. This is explained by the 
fact that the land that irrigated farms are obliged to set aside for buffer strips has a greater 
opportunity cost in terms of production capacity. Secondly, the obligation to diversify crops on 
very productive land has a short-term repercussion on farmers, cutting their income level as 
shown in Figure 7 below. 
Both cross-compliance instruments (prohibition of mono-cropping and obligation to keep up 
buffer strips) lead to a reduction in the emission of polluting substances. The switch in 
production techniques from more intensive to more extensive practices suggests a notable 
improvement in the state of the environment. 
Therefore, the policy goal for these instruments, which we recall was soil conservation, nitrates 
reduction and increased biodiversity, appears to be achieved at least to some extent. 
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Figure 7. The net income variation: Cross-compliance 
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9   “Partial decoupling with annual modulation, cross-compliance measures and the tax on 
nitrogen fertilizers” 
This instrument shows how the state of the environment should theoretically improve depending 
on different levels of tax applied on nitrogen fertilizer buying (see Annex 2, Tables 18, 19 and 
20). After simulating a number of levels (euros/kg), it is found that the fall in farmers’ income 
depends on the level of tax applied, as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 8. The net income variation: Tax (euros/kg) 
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Analysing the results, we find that farmers make practically no modification in their crop mix or 
technical itineraries. Consequently, the extra cost inflicted to the farmers by paying the nitrates 
tax will not result in any real improvement in environmental conditions. Therefore, the nitrate 
tax proves to be a non-effective instrument for reducing farming-induced soil pollution by 
nitrates as no major environmental improvement is expected and farm income loss will be 
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Scenario 3. Support price reduction and full decoupling 
For this last scenario, we have simulated the results for just one of the model farms built. The 
selected farm was farm number 2, which has an area of 80 ha and has both rain-fed and irrigated 
land (see Annex 2, Table 22). 
We have found that there is a high percentage fall (63%) in the maize-growing area, as there is 
in the durum wheat- and cotton-growing area (46%). On the other hand, the special crops and 
chickpea-growing areas (+19.75% and +124%, respectively) increase due to the high gross 
margin of these two crops. 
As regards income level, there is found to be a sizeable fall (12.31%) with respect to the same 
scenarios but at current prices. This fall could, therefore, compromise the future of arable and 
especially rain-ed farms even more. 
As regards the impact on the environment, we can say that practices actually do become slightly 
more extensive. The possible cause is the use of non-ploughing or minimum ploughing 
techniques with the sole objective of cost cutting. 
5. Conclusions 
We can summarise some of the main conclusions as follows:  
1.  The deployment of the new CAP will not lead to drastic changes in the current situation 
with respect to land use and cropping patterns in the two regions studied. In general, crops 
with a substantial comparative advantage in the production-based coupled payments (such 
as maize) will be reduced. Comparing the two regions, these reductions will be more 
prominent in the inland region of continental agriculture (Castilla) than in the 
Mediterranean region (Andalucia) with a more varied cropping mix and productive 
potential.  
2.  The reduction of the area dedicated to crops with a greater comparative advantage under 
Agenda 2000 (e.g. maize, cotton, durum wheat) and the increase in the non-COP water-
intensive vegetable crops, like potato, would justify the implementation of restrictive 
measures on the growing of such products by the EU with the aim of preventing market 
distortions. The only cereal benefiting from the reform is soft wheat (these results match 
CAPRI Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact Analysis). 
3.  Partial and full decoupling will have repercussions on farmers’ income level. The results 
differ depending on whether the farms are irrigated, where the income level increases, or 
rain-fed, where income falls considerably. Therefore, the reform could lead to land 
abandonment in less-productive rain-fed marginal areas. 
4.  One of the main goals of the 2003 CAP reform was to promote more extensive farming in 
Europe and therefore encourage environmental protection. The results obtained show no 
such improvement in the new CAP decoupled scenarios unless additional measures to 
protect the environment are introduced. We can deduce from the results that cross-
compliance and good agricultural and environmental conditions (GAEC) will contribute 
substantially to improving and protecting the environment even though they amount to an 
additional cost for farmers. 
5.  The measure introducing a tax on the purchase of nitrogen fertilizers does not appear to be 
very efficient in terms of improving nitrogen fertilizer management. This measure will lead 
to a very slight improvement in environmental protection but will inflict considerable 
reductions in the farmers’ income. 22 | VARELA-ORTEGA, SIMÓ & BLANCO 
   
6.  As regards the integration of agricultural and water conservation policies (region of 
Castilla), a water conservation policy will be spatial-specific and would not yield the same 
results in all water districts for all policy scenarios considered. An equivalent water tariffs 
policy aimed at recovering the full cost of water services (as required by the Water 
Framework Directive) will be more cost-effective in the areas of larger farms that can 
benefit from the economies of scales (where a 50% reduction in water use will entail an 
equivalent amount of income loss). 
7.    We can then conclude that the application of the EU Water Framework Directive in 
conjunction with the new CAP reform would have to be examined carefully. Achieving the 
goals of costs recovery (financial and environmental) could have negative effects on 
farmers’ income. And would question the viability of many irrigated farms in Spain. In 
particular in this study, we found that for prices at which costs can be recovered (0.06€/m3), 
not only would there be no water savings, but also farmers would be losing from 25% to 
50% of their income. It is therefore essential to analyse the cost-effectiveness of the policy, 
that is, its capacity to achieve the environmental goals of conserving water resources 
without over penalising farmers’ income as stipulated in Art. 4 of WFD: 
Member States may aim to achieve less stringent environmental objectives than 
those required for specific bodies…when their natural condition is such that the 
achievement of these objectives would be infeasible or disproportionately 
expensive, and all the following conditions are met. 
8.  Therefore integrating both agricultural policies and water polices in the EU will be crucial 
and a sound combination of both types of policies will have to be encouraged.  Specifically, 
as the new decoupled CAP will influence crop mix changes and hence water consumption 
in a different manner across water districts,  their specific agro-climatic, structural and 
institutional features would need to be taken into account, as stipulated in Art. 9 of the EU 
WFD: 
Member States may in so doing have regard to the social, environmental and 
economic effects of the recovery as well as the geographic and climatic conditions 
of the region or regions affected. 
9.  Reduction in crop prices and full decoupling will have significant effects on international 
trade. These effects are denoted by a sharp reduction of certain crops such as maize, cotton 
and durum wheat growing as a result of the reduction of production-based direct payments 
and market price decrease. On the other hand, in the EU domestic markets, an increase in 
water-intensive crops, e.g. potato and fruits, could be expected to substitute for maize for 
example, which will result in negative impacts to the environment. Consequently, measures 
that limit the production of these crops as stipulated in the CAP reform cross-compliance 
regulation (Regulations 1782/03 and 796/04) might be applied. These measures prevent 
farmers benefiting from the single farm payment from redirecting their activities to the 
production of fruit and potatoes. 
10. Reduction in crop prices as a response to trade negotiations is likely to produce a reduction 
in farm intensification and hence a beneficial effect on the environment.  However, this 
positive environmental impact, which is one of the objectives of the reform, may not reach 
the expected levels in a balanced and cost-effective manner. In fact, it will involve negative 
socio-economic impacts as it will lead to considerable farm income losses that might 
question the feasibility of certain farms, especially in rain-fed agricultural systems in 
marginal areas of Spain. | 23 
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Annexes 
ANNEX 1. FARM TYPOLOGY 
 
Table 1. Farm typology in the Saldaña-Valdavia region (Palencia) 
 
LAND DISTRIBUTION (SALDAÑA-VALDAVIA REGION) 
FARM SIZE  % 
FARMS 
% AREA 
(UAA)  AVERAGE AREA (ha) 
< 5 ha  7.71  0.18  1.56 
5-20 ha  19.17  3.51  12.05 
20-50 ha  29.19  14.81  33.36 
50-100 ha  23.6  24.28  67.63 
100-200 ha  13.97  28.29  133.2 
>200 ha  6.36  28.93  299.34 
Source: Own elaboration from INE (1999). 
 
 
Figure 1. Farm typology in the Saldaña-Valdavia region (Palencia) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from INE (1999). 
 
Table 2. Farm typology in the Centro region (Valladolid) 
 
LAND DISTRIBUTION (CENTRO REGION) 
FARM SIZE  % FARMS  % AREA 
(UAA) 
AVERAGE 
AREA (ha) 
<5 ha  19.59  0.55  1.51 
5-20 ha  19.14  3.42  10.54 
20-50 ha  21.59  12.14  33.2 
50-100 ha  18.21  21.25  68.89 
100-200 ha  12.71  28.31  131.42 
>200 ha  6.76  34.33  299.68 
Source: Own elaboration from INE (1999). 
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Figure 2. Farm typology in the Centro region (Valladolid) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from INE (1999). 
 
Table 3. Farm typology in the Cordoba region (Andalucía) 
 
   %FARMS  AREA% 
<5ha  54.11  4.40 
5- 20ha  27.29  11.87 
20 -50ha  8.90  11.75 
50-100ha  4.16  12.32 
>100  5.54  59.66 
 
Figure 3. Farm typology in Córdoba (Andalucía) 
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ANNEX 2. RESULT TABLES FOR ANDALUCÍA 
Table 4. Crop prices (2003) 
Crop  Price (euros/t) 
Durum wheat  163.29 
Soft wheat  157.30 
Maize  141.70 
Sunflower  269.61 
Chickpeas  486 
Source: IEA (2004). 
 
Table 5. Single farm payment 
Farms  SFP (euros / farm) 
Representative farm No. 1  8.949 
Representative farm No. 2  30.454 
Representative farm No. 3  55.869 
 
Table 6. Water availability  
Crops  Cropwat
2 (mm) 
Wheat  289.38 
Maize  588.9 
Chickpeas and Beans 171.82 
Sunflower  278.7 
Cotton  788 
Source: Cropwat (FAO). 
Table 7. Fixed costs/faro 
 
Farms  Fixed costs (euros / ha) 
Representative farm No. 1  660 
Representative farm No. 2  340 
Representative farm No. 3  181 
         Source: INAGRO SA. 
 
Table 8. Nitrogen Units 
Crop  Irrigated (nitrogen units/ha)  Rain-fed (nitrogen units/ha) 
  Intensive  Extensive  Intensive  Extensive 
Wheat   160  120  120  100 
Corn  500  400     
Cotton  250  160     
Chickpeas and Beans  50  30   
Source: INAGRO SA. 
                                                 
2 Cropwat: is a decision support system developed by the Land and Water Development Division of FAO. 
See http://www.fao.org/ag/AGL/aglw/cropwat.stm 30 | VARELA-ORTEGA, SIMÓ & BLANCO 
   
 
Table 9. Scenario simulation - Farm type no. 1 
  Full decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Partial decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Baseline situation 
 (% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  35.4  34.65  37.8 
Soft Wheat (TB)  4.52  2.75  0 
Cotton (AG)  11.7  13.8  14.2 
Maize (MI)  19.02  20.5  19.21 
Special crop (CS)  24.3  23.3  23.3 
Fallow  5  5  5 
 
Table 10. Scenario simulation - Farm type no. 2 
  Full decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Partial decoupling  
(% ha) 
Baseline situation 
 (% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  25.7  25.3  28.3 
Soft Wheat (TB)  17.19  12.8  14.2 
Cotton (AG)  11  10.75  14 
Maize (MI)  15.9  15.5  13 
Sunflower (GI)  11.2  11.2  11.2 
Chickpeas (GB)  6  6  6.3 
Special crop (CS)  8.1  8.1  8.1 
Fallow  5  5  5 
 
Table 11. Scenario simulation - Farm type no. 3 
  Full decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Partial decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Baseline situation 
 (% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  29.8  29.8  30.75 
Soft Wheat (TB)  18.6  18.6  16.75 
Cotton (AG)  -  -  - 
Maize (MI)  6.75  6.75  6.25 
Sunflower (GI)  17.50  17.50  17.50 
Chickpeas (GB)  23.75  23.75  23.75 
Fallow  5  5  5 
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Table 12. Income effects of policy scenarios  
 
Representative farm 
No. 1 
Representative farm 
No. 2 
Representative farm 
No. 3 
Full decoupling 
Without modulation  12.84%  5.04%  -15.42% 
4%  11.07% 2.27% -19.24% 
5%  10.61% 1.55% -20.20% 
Partial decoupling 
Without modulation  8.48% 2.80%  -15.91% 
4%  6.79% 0.01%  -19.71% 
5%  6.33% -0.73%  -20.66% 
 
Table 13. Cross-compliance simulation - Farm type no. 1 
  Full decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Partial decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Baseline situation 
 (% ha) 
Cross-compliance 
(% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  35.4  34.65  37.8  32.38 
Soft Wheat (TB)  3.52  2.75  0  13.31 
Cotton (AG)  11.7  13.8  14.2  - 
Maize ( MI)  21.02  20.5  19.21  23.38 
Special crop (CS)  23.3  23.3  23.3  23.3 
Strip  -  -  -  2.6 
Fallow  5  5  5  5 
 
Table14. Cross-compliance simulation - Farm type no. 2 
  Full decoupling  
(% ha) 
Partial decoupling  
(% ha) 
Baseline situation  
(% ha) 
Cross-compliance 
(% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  25.7  25.3  28.3  23.8 
Soft Wheat (TB)  17.19  12.8  14.2  18 
Cotton (AG)  11  10.75  14  9.5 
Maize ( MI)  15.9  15.5  13  16.75 
Sunflower (GI)  11.2  11.2  11.2  11.25 
Chickpeas (GB)  6  6  6.3  5.3 
Special crop (CS)  8.1  8.1  8.1  8.1 
Strip  -  -  -  2.13 
Fallow  5  5  5  5 
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Table15. Cross-compliance simulation - Farm type no. 3 
  Full decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Partial decoupling 
 (% ha) 
Baseline situation 
 (% ha) 
Cross-compliance 
(% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  29.8  29.8  30.75  30 
Soft Wheat (TB)  18.6  18.6  16.75  16 
Maize (MI)  6.75  6.75  6.25  5.5 
Chickpeas (GB)  17.50  17.50  17.50  17.50 
Special crop (CS)  23.75  23.75  23.75  23 
Strip  -  -  -  3 
Fallow  5  5  5  5 
 
 
Table 16. Farm income variation in the partial decoupling plus cross-compliance 
scenario 
FARMS  VARIATION (%) 
Representative farm No. 1  -8.86% 
Representative farm No. 2  -2.79% 
Representative farm No. 3  -1.17% 
 
Table 17. Farm income variation in the full decoupling plus cross-compliance scenario 
FARMS  VARIATION (%) 
Representative farm No. 1  -2.07% 
Representative farm No. 2  -2.79% 
Representative farm No. 3  -20.88% 
 
Table 18. Simulated effects of a tax on nitrate fertilizer - Farm type no. 1 
  Baseline situation 
 (% ha) 
Cross-compliance  
(% ha) 
Tax  
(% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  37.8  32.38  32.37 
Soft Wheat (TB)  0  13.31  14.37 
Cotton (AG)  14.2  -  - 
Maize ( MI)  19.21  23.38  23.3 
Special Crop  23.3  23.3  23.3 
Strip  -  2.6  - 
Fallow  5  5  5 
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Table 19. Simulated effects of a tax on nitrate fertilizer - Farm type no. 2 
  Baseline situation 
 (% ha) 
Cross-compliance  
(% ha) 
Tax 
 (% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  28.3  23.8  23.21 
Soft Wheat (TB)  14.2  18  18.21 
Cotton (AG)  14  9.5  9.5 
Maize ( MI)  13  16.75  16.9 
Sunflower (GI)  11.2  11.25  11.25 
Chickpeas (GB)  6.3  5.3  5 
Special crop (CS)  8.1  8.1  8.1 
Strip  -  2.13  2.13 
Fallow  5  5  5 
 
Table 20. Simulated effects of a tax on nitrate fertilizer - Farm type no. 3 
  Baseline situation 
 (% ha) 
Cross-compliance 
 (% ha) 
Tax 
 (% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  30.75  30  30.01 
Soft Wheat (TB)  16.75  16  16.25 
Cotton (AG)  6.25  5.5  5.71 
Maize ( MI)  17.50  17.50  17.50 
Sunflower (GI)  23.75  23  23.02 
Strip  -  3  3 
Fallow  5  5  5 
 
Table 21. Farm income effects of a partial decoupling scenario with cross-compliance 
measures and a tax on nitrogen fertilizer  
FARMS  Tax 0.5 
(euros/kg) 
Tax 0.3 
(euros/kg) 
Tax 0.15 
(euros/kg) 
Tax 0.06 
(euros/kg) 
Representative farm No. 1  -14.07%  -8.7%  -4.5%  -1.8% 
Representative farm No. 2  -15.9%  -9.83%  -4.9%  -1.86% 
Representative farm No. 3  -15.5%  -9.34%  -4.53%  -1.6% 
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Table 22. Crop prices reduction scenario - Farm type no. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Crop prices reduction  
(10 %) 
Cross-compliance situation  
(% ha) 
Durum Wheat (TD)  21.67  23.8 
Soft Wheat (TB)  19.13  18 
Cotton (AG)  5.14  9.5 
Maize ( MI)  6.26  16.75 
Sunflower (GI)  8.00  11.25 
Chickpeas (GB)  13.90  5.3 
Special crop (CS)  8.50  8.1 
Strip  2.13  2.13 
Fallow  5.00  5 THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY | 35 
 
ANNEX 3. RESULT TABLES FOR CASTILLA Y LEÓN 
• Agenda 2000-Partial Decoupling 
 
Table 23. Crop distribution in the two policy scenarios 
VSC WUA AREA (%)  CD WUA AREA(%)   
CROPS (%)  AGENDA 
2000 
PARTIAL 
DECOUPLING 
AGENDA 
2000 
PARTIAL 
DECOUPLING 
BARLEY.INT  9.5  13.8  6.5  6.8 
BARLEY.EXT  5.8  12.4  12  14.1 
WHEAT.INT  11.4  8.2  -  - 
WHEAT.EXT  12.7  6.2  38.3  36.4 
MAIZE  37.3  34  12  9.8 
SUGARBEET  7.6  7.6  12.6  12.6 
SUNFLOWER.INT  5.6  4.4  -  - 
SUNFLOWER.EXT  -  -  0.1  0 
POTATO  1  4.6  10.9  12.8 
FALLOW  9.1  8.8  7.6  7.5 
 
Figure 4. Crop distribution in the two policy scenarios (VSC WUA) 
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Figure 5. Crop distribution in the two policy scenarios (CD WUA) 
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• Water Pricing 
Table 24. Effects of the application of water prices in the Agenda 2000 scenario (VSC WUA) 
Tariff 
WATER 
PRICE 
(€/m
3) 
WATER 
CONSUMPTION 
(m
3/ha) 
EXPECTED 
INCOME 
(€/ha) 
LOSS OF 
EXPECTED 
INCOME 
(%) 
FARM 
GROSS 
MARGIN 
(€/ha) 
WUA 
REVENUE  
(VARIABLE) 
(€/ha) 
WUA 
REVENUE  
(TOTAL) 
(€/ha) 
1  0  4650  461,43  100  480,43  0  77 
2  0.015  4650  408.42  88.51  427.42  69.75  146.75 
3  0.03  4650  355.41  77.02  374.41  139.5  216.5 
4  0.045  4650  302.40  65.53  321.40  209.25  286.25 
5  0.06  4650  249.39  54.047  268.39  279  356 
6  0.075  4650  196.38  42.55  215.38  348.75  425.75 
7  0.09  4417.66  143.58  31.11  161.66  397.59  474.59 
8  0.105  4304.85  93.384  20.23  111.30  452.01  529.01 
9  0.12  2363.08  58.742  12.73  71.27  283.56  360.56 
10  0.135  2068.75  34.246  7.42  49.56  279.28  356.28 
11  0.15  1470.52  12.798  2.77  24.90  220.57  297.57 
12  0.165  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
13  0.18  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
14  0.195  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
15  0.21  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
16  0.225  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
17  0.24  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
18  0.255  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
19  0.27  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
20  0.285  0  7.19  1.55  18.2  0  77 
Table 25. Land distribution effects of the application of water prices (Agenda 2000, VSC WUA) 
TARIF.  P  (€/m3)  FALL. 
(%) 
WH.INT 
(%) 
WH.EXT 
(%) 
BARL.INT 
(%) 
BARL.EXT 
(%) 
MAIZ
E (%) 
SUGARB
. (%) 
SUNF.INT 
(%) 
POTAT.
(%) 
PEA. 
(%) 
1  0  9.13  11.41  12.69  9.53  5.7  37.2  7.6  5.6  1.02  0 
2  0.015  9.13  11.41  12.69  9.53  5.7  37.2  7.6  5.6  1.02  0 
3  0.03  9.13  11.41  12.69  9.53  5.7  37.2  7.6  5.6  1.02  0 
4  0.045  9.13  11.41  12.69  9.53  5.7  37.2  7.6  5.6  1.02  0 
5  0.06  9.13  11.41  12.69  9.53  5.7  37.2  7.6  5.6  1.02  0 
6  0.075  9.13  11.41  12.69  9.53  5.7  37.2  7.6  5.6  1.02  0 
7  0.09  9.17  10.2  13.3  14.12  5.0  34.9  7.6  4.9  0.64  0 
8  0.105  9.2  0  16.2  24.4  2.1  35.1  7.6  4.7  0.36  0 
9  0.12  9.24  5.8  9.3  48.55  14.6  4.79  7.6  0  0  0 
10  0.135  9.24  0  9.0  59.16  14.9  0  7.6  0  0  0 
11  0.15  9.32  0  18.7  34.2  30.8  0  6.78  0  0  0 
12  0.165  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
13  0.18  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
14  0.195  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
15  0.21  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
16  0.225  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
17  0.24  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
18  0.255  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
19  0.27  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
20  0.285  10  0  35.3  0  31.75  0  0  0  0  22.8 
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• Crop prices reduction 
 
Table 26. Farmers’ strategy for partial decoupling, full decoupling with crop prices 
reduction and full decoupling with crop prices reduction and limit on potato growing 
(Vegas de Saldaña y Carrión WUA) 
 
CROPS (%)  PARTIAL 
DECOUPLING 
FULL DECOUPLING + 
CROP PRICES 
REDUCTION 
FULL DECOUPLING + CROP 
PRICES REDUCTION + POTATO 
LIMIT 
BARLEY.INT  13.8  2.1  -  
BARLEY.EXT  12.4  -   -  
WHEAT.INT  8.2  15.39  -  
WHEAT.EXT  6.2  19.86  18.72 
MAIZE  34  -   14.03 
SUGARBEET  7.6  7.6  7.6 
SUNFLOWER.INT  4.4  20.9  43.57 
SUNFLOWER.EXT   -  -   -  
POTATO  4.6  27.69  7.6 
FALLOW  8.8  6.46  8.48 
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ANNEX 4. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Both models have the same overall structure: a farm model where the farmer maximises 
his/her objective function subject to different kinds of constraints.  
The model includes some specificities for each of the regions, which will be explained 
as applicable.  
The Castilla y León model is defined by: 
1. Objective function 
 
The objective function is defined by a utility function that represents the net margin 
(income) less the farmer’s risk represented by the standard deviation depending on different 
states of nature and the market. The objective function is defined by the following equation: 
 
σ × − Ζ = PHI MaxU    (1) 
 
where: 
 
U: is the utility 
Z: is the net income level 
PHI: is the risk aversion coefficient 
σ: is the sum of the standard deviations as a function of different states of nature and different 
states of the market assuming the distribution to be normal. 
 
 
1.1  The risk  equation in the model is as follows:  
 
     ∑ + − =
n i in iz N V V / ) 1 ) ) ( (
2 / 1 2 σ  (2) 
 
where N=100 because of the combination of the 10 states of nature representing agronomic 
variability and 10 states of the market representing economic variability. 
 
1.2   Income function 
i) Castilla y León region model: 
 
-  A series of production activities “c”, which represent the area defined by a given crop. 
-  production sub-activities “cop”, subset that covers cereals, oilseed and protein crops. 
-  two, typically Spanish, production techniques “t”, rain-fed and irrigation. 
-  decision-making variables “X”, which represent the area defined by a given crop and by a 
given associated production technique. 
-  two periods of the year “p”, winter and summer, representative of the seasonal distribution 
of the labour characteristic of the region. 
The income equation is as follows: 
 THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS ON MULTIFUNCTIONALITY | 39 
 
∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑∑
= =
== ==
× − × − × −
− × − × − − × × +
+ × × × + × =
r
p
p
r
p
p
ct
n
c
m
t
ct ct
n
c
ct
m
t
MOC PMO DMO CO SREG CANON
SREG THA QA TM ACOP MODUL DPU
MODUL ACOP X PRIMA X MB Z
1 1
11 11
3 ) 1 ( (3A) 
where: 
 
- ct MB : represents the gross margin obtained by crop type and activity type in €/ha.  
- ct X : decision-making variables that represent the growing area (in hectares) by crop type (c) 
and activity type (t). 
- CT PRIMA : CAP support received by crop type and selected technique (in €/ha) that will 
continue to be coupled to production. 
- ACOP: support coupling level. This is a scalar that can have different values depending on 
the adopted policy. A value of 0 in the case of full decoupling and a value of 0.25 in the case of 
partial decoupling. 
-MODUL : Percentage of support modulation (3%, 4% and 5%). 
-DPU : represents the single farm payment. This payment is calculated as the mean support 
received during the 2000/2001/2002 and is received irrespective of production and growing 
area. 
- 3 TM : refers to the unit cost of water in €/m
3. This is the values that will be simulated in the 
model for different water tariffs.  
-QA: is the amount of water used expressed in thousands of cubic metres. It will be a variable 
to be defined by the model that depends on crop irrigation water needs and the technical water 
distribution efficiency coefficient.  
-THA and CANON : are the prices in €/ha paid by farmers to the water user associations and 
the Hydrographical Confederation, respectively
3. 
-SREG : irrigated area in ha, which will be defined for each model farm. 
-CO: is the family labour opportunity cost (€/h). This cost has been assumed to be somewhat 
lower than paid labour obtained from surveys to prevent all labour being allotted to family 
labour.  
- p DOM : represents the availability of labour (hours) depending on the period of the year in 
question. Its value will be higher in winter than in summer and greater on larger than smaller 
farms. 
-PMO : is the price of hired labour (€/h), that is, paid labour.
4  
 
- p MOC : is hired labour measured in hours labour is hired for. It will be a variable to be 
determined by the model. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 These data have been obtained from WUA and INE surveys (2002). 
4  Values have been obtained from farmer surveys and data from real farms run by the farm management 
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ii) Andalucía region model: 
  
 
where: 
 
-Xast : is a variable of area by activity (A), soil type (S) and technique type (T). 
-PDTast: represents the product of each of the possible combinations, calculated by multiplying 
the mean yield of each crop, depending on soil type and technique type in each case, by the 
mean price
5.  
-AIDSast.: volume of support for each of the crop combinations that will continue to be coupled 
to production. As in the other cases, it has been calculated for each activity as the mean support 
received for the four crops in each rotation. 
-DECOUP: support coupling level. This is a scalar that can have different values depending on 
the adopted policy. A value of 0 in the case of full decoupling and a value of 0.25 in the case of 
partial decoupling. 
-Alpha: Percentage of support modulation (3%, 4% and 5%). 
-SFP: represents the single farm payment. This payment is calculated as the mean support 
received during the 2000/2001/2002 and is received irrespective of production and growing 
area.
6 
-COast : set of direct costs by activity, soil and technique.
7 
-CWATERast  : water consumption of each combination (by activity, soil and technique), 
calculated as the mean for each combination.
8 
-CTEWATER: is the water price value that is multiplied by the volume of water consumed. In 
this case, we have assumed that all three farms consume water from wells at different costs in 
each simulation (from 0.03 to 0.9 euros/m
3 depending on depth). 
-CFIX: represent the fixed costs of each farm, obtained in the same way as direct costs. To 
assure that the calculation of the fixed costs was representative at the level of the model farms, 
we consulted the study entitled Análisis del impacto de diversos sistemas de ayudas directas 
sobre al campiña de Córdoba (Analysis of the impact of several direct payment schemes on the 
countryside of Cordoba) (Castillo et al., 2001), which determines the costs by farm size and 
activity. 
                                                 
5  See Table 4, Annex 2. 
7  See Table 5, Annex 2. 
7  It has been calculated from real data obtained in the yield work survey and from the farm management 
firm ‘INAGRO’ taken from their accounting data. (Seville). 
9  See Table 6, Annex 2. 
10 See Table 7, Annex 2. 
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2. Constraints  
 
2.1 Land constraints 
 
i) Total land constraint (4) 
 
where UAA is utilised agricultural area. 
For the Andalucían model, we also introduced constraints for each soil type, such that 
the number of hectares did not exceed the amount of land available for each soil type: 
  (5), (6), (7) and (8) 
 
ii) Irrigated land constraint 
In the Castilla y León model there is a constraint on the area of irrigated land: 
 
∑
=
≤
n
c
c SREG X
1
int ,  (9) 
 
2.2 Labour constraints 
This constraint is only included in the Castilla y León model: 
The labour needs (NMOct) have to be covered by the availability of family labour 
(DMOp) and hired labour on the market in each period (MOCp). 
 
∑ ∑
= =
+ ≤
m
t
p p ct
n
c
MOC DMO NMO
1 1
 (10) 
 
2.3 Water availability constraints 
 
 In the case of the Castilla y León model, the crop water needs (NAGUAct) have to be 
met by the water that really reached the plot, which will be equal to the gross allotment (DOT: 
allotment granted by the Hydrographical Confederation to the water users association) taking 
into account a technical efficiency coefficient (h). 
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  In the case of Andalucía, irrigation water availability has been expressed as follows:  
 
where: 
 
-VOLWATER: volume of water available in m
3/ha.
9 
 
2.3- The policy constraints 
 
i) Crop limitation in the Castilla y Leon region 
This constraint allows us to come closer to reality by confining the area that can be 
allotted to sugar beet as observed on real farms in the region. 
 
∑
=
≤
m
t
t remol CUPO X
1
,  (13) 
-CUPO: sugar beet hectares (maximum). 
 
ii) Set aside rate 
There is a compulsory minimum and maximum land set aside rate for the COP growing 
area. The minimum compulsory set aside rate may vary, but has been set at 5% for the 
2003/2004 season.   
where: 
 
-TXR: minimum set aside rate (10% or 5%) 
-Xrst: number of farmed hectares “set aside” for each soil type and technique. 
-SCOP: Cereals, oilseed and protein crops growing area.  
 
iii) Cross-compliance constraints 
Two equations have been introduced that will translate some of the measures to be 
introduced in the spanish legislation bill on the application of cross compliance in CAP direct 
payments.
10 The first concerns the maintenance of a given COP growing area land for buffer 
strips. The second condition concerns the maintenance of biodiversity, that is, the prohibition of 
mono-cropping which, in this case, will only affect maize mono-cropping, as it is the only 
activity that has been assumed to be possible in a mono-cropping system.  
 
 
                                                 
9 For this research, we have opted for allotments assuming a localised irrigation method with a State 
Coordinated Plans irrigated areas channel head. 
10 Spanish Council 2352/2004 of 23th December 2004. 
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where: 
 
-Xbst: number of hectares for the ‘strip’ activity (b), each soil type (s) and technique type (T). 
-Xamst: number of hectares for the ‘mono-cropping activity’ (am), each soil type (s) and 
technique type (T). 
-TXECO: Cross-compliance rate: 0.3 
 
iv)Tax upon nitrogen fertilizer buying:  
TAXINPUT Tax Nitro X
ast
ast ast = × × ∑∑∑  (19) 
where: 
-Nitroast: number of nitrogen units per activity, soil type and technique 
-Tasa: tax levied in euros/kg 
-TASINPUT: total tax in euros. 
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